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Abstract
This research was performed to expand AFIT’s Radio Frequency “Distinct Native
Attribute” (RF-DNA) fingerprinting process to support IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee communi-
cation network applications. Current ZigBee bit-level security measures include use of
network keys and Media Access Control (MAC) lists which can be subverted through
interception and spoofing using open-source hacking tools. This work addresses device
discrimination using Physical (PHY) waveform alternatives to augment existing bit-level
security mechanisms. ZigBee network vulnerability to outsider threats was assessed using
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves to characterize both Authorized Device
ID Verification performance (granting network access to authorized users presenting true
bit-level credentials) and Rogue Device Rejection performance (denying network access to
unauthorized rogue devices presenting false bit-level credentials).
Radio Frequency ‘Distinct Native Attribute’ (RF-DNA) features are extracted from
time-domain waveform responses of 2.4 GHz CC2420 ZigBee transceivers to enable
human-like device discrimination. The fingerprints were constructed using a “hybrid”
pool of emissions collected under a range of conditions, including anechoic chamber
and an indoor office environment where dynamic multi-path and signal degradation
factors were present. The RF-DNA fingerprints were input to a Multiple Discriminant
Analysis, Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) discrimination process and a 1 vs. many
“Looks most like?” classification assessment made. The hybrid MDA model was
also used for 1 vs. 1 “Looks how much like?” verification assessment. ZigBee
Device Classification performance was assessed using both full and reduced dimensional
fingerprint sets. Reduced dimensional subsets were selected using Dimensional Reduction
Analysis (DRA) by rank ordering 1) pre-classification Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)-Test
p-values and 2) post-classification Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-
iv
Improved (GRLVQI) λi feature relevance values. Assessment of Zigbee device ID
verification capability included both Authorized Device ID Verification and Rogue Device
Rejection.
Device Classification performance using full-dimensional fingerprints comprised
of NF=729 features achieved an arbitrary benchmark of average correct classification
%C>90% (across all devices) for S NR≥10.0 dB. Performance using DRA≈66% (NF̂=243)
reduced dimensional subsets was marginally poorer and yielded a “gain” of G≈−1.0 dB at
%C=90% relative to full-dimensional performance; gain is the reduction in required S NR
for two systems, methods, etc., to achieve a given %C. Additional KS-Test and GRLVQI
DRA feature selection was performed and classification performance assessed using the
top-ranked NF̂=200, 100, 50, and 25 features. Relative to the %C>90% benchmark, the
KS-Test and GRLVQI selected feature sets required the same S NR≈10.0 dB (NF̂=243)
to S NR≈18.0 dB (NF̂=50). For NF̂=25, KS-Test selected features failed to meet the
benchmark while GRLVQI selected features achieved the benchmark at S NR≈30.0 dB.
Authorized Device ID Verification performance was evaluated using the NF̂=50 DRA
feature set. Results indicate the existence of a device dependent threshold whereby all
authorized devices achieve an arbitrary True Verification Rate (TVR>90%) and False
Verification Rate (FVR<10%) benchmark for both DRA methods. Rogue Device Rejection
was assessed using unauthorized rogue devices, with each rogue device falsely presenting
a claimed ID matching each of the authorized device IDs. Considering an arbitrary
Rogue Rejection Rate (RRR>90%) benchmark, ROC curve analysis for Rogue Device
Rejection indicated that performance using KS-Test and GRLVQI selected feature sets were
consistent. The KS-test DRA selected feature sets achieved RRR>90% in 21, 29, and 30 of
36 rogue scenarios using NF̂=100, 50, and 25 top-ranked features, respectively. Similarly,
the GRLVQI DRA selected features achieved RRR>90% in 23, 28, and 30 of the 36 rogue
scenarios using NF̂=100, 50, and 25 top-ranked features, respectively.
v
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USING RF-DNA FINGERPRINTS TO DISCRIMINATE ZIGBEE DEVICES IN AN
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
I. Introduction
1.1 Operational Motivation
Wireless Personal Area networks (WPANs) are increasing in popularity and are widely
deployed in office buildings, factories, home networks, and hospitals. The Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4 Media Access Control (MAC) and
Physical-layer (PHY) standards provide a low power, low-data-rate WPAN foundation
on which network (NWK) and application (APL) layers are built, such as the ZigBee
specification [26]. ZigBee networks’ low implementation costs and low-complexity make
them a viable solution for applications such as industrial control and monitoring [14], home
automation, remote metering [46], patient vital sign monitoring [7], security systems [45],
and asset tracking [50]. Depending on the application, ZigBee networks transmit sensitive
personal information, control physical systems (valves, fans, lighting, doors, etc.), and
monitor critical sensors. Improved security measures is an essential component in allowing
ZigBee-based networks to be highly reliable and secure. The need for improving network
security is motivated by open source tools such as KillerBee [49] and Api-do [41]
which increase ZigBee network vulnerability and enable unauthorized rogue devices to
conduct packet replay, network key sniffing, MAC address spoofing, malicious network
impersonation, and denial of service type attacks.
Wireless networks are characterized by the seven layer Open Systems Interconnect
(OSI) model such as shown in Fig. 1.1 [1]. Traditionally, systems have predominantly
relied on ”bit-level” security mechanisms implemented in the Network (NWK) and
1
Figure 1.1: Multi-layer Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) network model [1].
Data Link (DLL) layers while generally ignoring the potential for PHY-layer security
augmentation. Exploiting this potential has been a major motivation for ongoing research
at Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) which exploits wireless device PHY waveform
features. This is accomplished using Radio Frequency ‘Distinct Native Attribute’ (RF-
DNA) fingerprints which provide unique, human-like device discrimination using RF-DNA
features that vary due to component manufacturing differences, component tolerances,
design differences, and device aging. The inherent RF-DNA is difficult to mimic and
replicate, allowing it to be useful in discrimination between multiple devices. PHY layer
security using RF-DNA fingerprints is a viable solution for augmenting higher layer (NWK
and DLL) bit-level security mechanisms.
2
1.2 Technical Motivation
AFIT’s RF-DNA fingerprinting process has evolved into the process shown in Fig. 1.2.
This process is constantly expanding by considering new signal types, new feature types,
new classification methods, and new device ID verification methods. Over the past several
years, extensive research has been conducted at AFIT [21, 23, 24, 28–30, 34, 35, 37–
40, 42, 47, 48] and contribution has been made to a larger body of research being
conducted by numerous researchers [8–10, 16–19, 27]. AFIT’s research activity has
predominately focused on RF-DNA fingerprinting for Device Classification using various
wireless communication signal types, such as Global System for Mobile Communication
(GSM) cellular phones [40, 47], IEEE 802.11 WiFi [21, 23, 24, 28, 29, 35, 42], and IEEE
802.16 WiMAX [34, 35, 37, 38, 48]. This research is no exception and the RF-DNA
process is adopted here to assess IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee Device Classification. However,
there has been a recent shift in AFIT research and this research is among the first few efforts
to consider Device ID Verification using RF-DNA fingerprints.
3
Figure 1.2: AFITs RF-DNA Fingerprinting Overview
4
1.3 Previous vs. Current Research
Table 1.1 provides a summary of technical areas that have been previously addressed
and areas addressed under this research.
Table 1.1: Technical Areas in Previous related work and Current research contributions.
The × symbol denots areas addressed.
Technical Area Previous Work Current Research
Addressed Ref # Addressed Ref #
1D Time Domain (TD) ×
[8, 17, 28, 29, 43, 47]
× [11, 12]
[42, 43, 47, 48]
1D Spectral Domain (SD) × [38, 48]
2D Wavelet Domain (WD) × [28–30]
2D Gabor (GT/GWT) × [21, 34, 35, 37, 38]
Signal Type
802.11a WiFi × [21, 28–30, 35, 48]
GSM Cellular × [39, 40, 47]
802.16e WiMax × [34, 35, 38, 48]
802.15.4 ZigBee × [31] × [11, 12]
Classifier Type
MDA/ML ×
[28–30, 42, 43, 47, 48]
× [11, 12]
[21, 31, 34, 38–40]
GRLVQI × [21, 28, 29, 35, 37]
LFS × [4–6, 21–24]
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA)
GRLVQI × [28, 29, 33, 35, 37] × [12]
LFS × [20, 21]
KS-Test × [31] × [12]
Device ID Verification
Authorized Device × [35, 37] × [12]
Rogue Device Rejection × [35, 37] × [12]
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1.4 Document Organization
The remainder of this document is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 - Background: Provides fundamental information on ZigBee IEEE
802.15.4 signal structure. Describes the previously established procedure for
extracting time-domain features. Explains Multiple Discriminant Analysis
(MDA) model development and Maximum Likelihood (ML) Classification.
• Chapter 3 - Research Methodology: Describes the specific methodology used
in this research to implement RF-DNA fingerprinting using experimentally
collected ZigBee emissions, including emission collection and post-collection
processing. Describes RF-DNA fingerprint quantitative Dimensional Reduc-
tion Analysis (DRA) methods, including: 1) pre-classification KS-Test p-value
ranking, and 2) post-classification GRLVQI λi relevance ranking. Details the
methodology used to perform ZigBee device discrimination, including Device
Classification, Authorized Device ID Verification, and Rogue Device Rejection.
• Chapter 4 - Results and Analysis: Provides results and performance analysis
for full-dimensional and DRA reduced dimensional RF-DNA fingerprinting
using KS-Test and GRLVQI selected feature sets. Device classification
performance for full-dimensional and reduced dimensional feature sets.
This includes assessment of Device Classification, Authorized Device ID
Verification, and Rogue Device Rejection capability.
• Chapter 5 - Summary and Conclusions: Presents a summary of research
activity, significant results, and recommendations for future research.
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II. Background
This chapter provides the technical background information supporting developmentof the methodology described in Chap. 3 and interpretation of results presented
in Chap. 4. Section 2.1 provides details for ZigBee-based networks built on IEEE
802.15.4 standard for wireless low-data-rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN).
Section 2.2 explains the process for generating RF-DNA fingerprints that are comprised
of statistical features extracted from time-domain emission responses. A description of
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) model development and Maximum Likelihood
(ML) classification processes are described in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively, and are
the foundation for MDA/ML processing used in developing Chap. 3 methodology.
2.1 ZigBee Signal Structure
ZigBee technology is used for WPANs and is seen in many applications requiring
a low data rate, long battery life, and low cost solution. These applications include
home automation, industrial control and monitoring, remote sensing/metering, medical
equipment and patient monitoring, asset tracking systems, security systems, lighting and
temperature control, etc. ZigBee-based networks are built on the WPAN IEEE 802.15.4
standard which defines the Physical (PHY) and Media Access Control (MAC) layer
structure. The ZigBee specification [51] defines the Network (NWK) layer specifications
and provides a framework for application programming in the Application (APL) layer.
Figure 2.1 shows the MAC frame format and PHY layer structure used by ZigBee [26].
As described in the 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 standard, the PHY Protocol Data Unit (PPDU)
packet structure consists of 1) a Synchronization Header (SHR) response which allows a
receiving device to synchronize and lock onto the bit stream, 2) a PHY Header (PHR)
response which contains frame length information, and 3) a variable length payload which
7
carries the MAC sublayer frame. The SHR region in Fig. 2.2 is comprised of a 32-bit
preamble and an 8-bit Start-of-Frame Delimiter (SFD) sequence. The preamble sequence
is designed for acquisition of symbol chip timing and is composed of a 32-bit binary
zero string. The SFD region is used to signify the end of preamble and consists of a
predefined 8-bit sequence of [1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1]. Information contained with the SHR region
remains constant and is independent of device emissions, individual device types, device
applications, etc. Early research reported in [11] exploited the preamble-only region of
ZigBee emissions for RF-DNA fingerprinting. Subsequent analysis revealed a greater level
of device discrimination can be realized using the entire SHR region (preamble and SFD).
Thus, the methodology described in Chap. 3 and results in Chap. 4 are based exclusively
on RF-DNA exracted from the SHR region.
Figure 2.1: Data frame PHY and MAC layer structures for a ZigBee packet [26].
2.2 Time-Domain RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation
The RF-DNA fingerprints for an emission Time Domain (TD) response are derived
from its instantaneous amplitude (a), phase (φ) and frequency ( f ) responses, as described
in [11, 12, 30, 33, 39, 40, 43, 48]. The corresponding characteristic sequences, having
8
Figure 2.2: PHY Protocol Data Unit (PPDU) packet structure for IEEE 802.15.4 [26].
elements denoted by a[n], φ[n], and f [n], are generated using NS complex I-Q signal
samples s[n]=sI[n]+ jsQ[n] from the specific Region Of Interest (ROI) in the collected
signal where the mean value is removed (centered) and then normalized (division by
maximum value) [30, 43]. Elements of the emission TD response are calculated by,
a[n] =
√
s2I [n] + s
2
Q[n], (2.1)
φ[n] = tan−1
[
sQ[n]
sI[n]
]
, for sI[n] , 0, (2.2)
f (n) =
1
2π
[
dφ(n)
dt
]
. (2.3)
Mean removal and normalization for each of the NS elements in characteristic
sequences, {a[n]}, {φ[n]}, and { f [n]}, is achieved using,
āc(n) =
a[n] − µa
max
n
{ac[n]}
, (2.4)
φ̄c[n] =
φ[n] − µφ
max
n
{φc[n]}
, (2.5)
f̄c[n] =
f [n] − µ f
max
n
{ fc[n]}
, (2.6)
where n = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,NS , and µa, µφ and µ f are the means of {a[n]}, {φ[n]}, and { f [n]}
calculated across NS samples, and max{·} denotes the maximum value of each feature
sequence’s centered magnitude.
RF-DNA fingerprints are compromised of statistical features extracted from instanta-
neous TD responses over a specific ROI in the collected signal [11, 12, 30, 33, 39, 40, 43,
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σ – Std Deviation
σ2 – Variance
γ – Skewness
κ – Kurtosis
fR3 = [ σR3, σ
2
R3, γR3, κR3 ]
Arbitrary Feature Sequence
Figure 2.3: Representative illustration of regional fingerprint marker generation for an
arbitrary ROI sequence using NR+1 total subregions and NM=4 statistical metrics [33].
48]. The selected ROI is a response region that is 1) ideally consistent across all collected
signals, and 2) independent of data modulation and device ID information. As shown in
Fig. 2.3, statistical RF-DNA features of standard deviation (σ), variance (σ2), skewness
(γ), and kurtosis (κ) are calculated over the ROI to form regional fingerprint markers gen-
erated by: 1) dividing each selected characteristic sequence {a[n]},{φ[n]}, and { f [n]} into
NR contiguous, equal length subsequences such that NS /NR is an integer, 2) calculating NM
metrics for each subsequence, plus the entire fingerprinted region as a whole (NR+1 total
regions), and 3) arranging the metrics in a vector of the form,
FRi = [σRi σ
2
Ri γRi κRi]1×4 , (2.7)
where i = 1, 2, . . . ,NR + 1. The NM metrics for each subsequence are calculated from,
µ =
1
N
N∑
n=1
x[n] , (2.8)
σ =
√
1
N
N∑
n=1
(x[n] − µ)2 , (2.9)
σ2 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
(x[n] − µ)2 , (2.10)
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γ =
1
Nσ3
N∑
n=1
(x[n] − µ)3 , (2.11)
κ =
1
Nσ4
N∑
n=1
(x[n] − µ)4 , (2.12)
where x[n] is the nth feature vector element and N is the total number of samples in each
subsequence used to calculate the statistic.
The marker vectors from (2.7) are concatenated to form the composite characteristic
vector for each characteristic and are given by,
F = [FR1
...FR2
...FR3 . . . FRNR+1 ]1×[NM×(NR+1)] (2.13)
If only one signal characteristic is used (a, φ, or f ), the expression in (2.13) represents the
final classification fingerprint. When all NC = 3 signal characteristics are used, the final RF
fingerprint is generated by concatenating vectors from (2.13) according to
F = [Fa
... Fφ
... F f ]1×[NM×(NR+1)×NC] (2.14)
The final full-dimensional RF fingerprint (2.14) is a vector comprised of NF features, where
NF = NM × (NR + 1) × NC (2.15)
2.3 Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA)
The research methodology presented in Chap. 3 is based on fundamental MDA
concepts described in this section. MDA is a linear method of projecting high-dimensional
data into a lower-dimensional space that best separates data in a least-squares sense [13].
MDA is performed on RF-DNA fingerprints to reduce the feature dimensionality and aid
in the development of a class (device) specific model as described in 3.5.1.
MDA is an extension of Fisher’s Linear Discriminant process when discrimination of
two or more classes is required (NC>2). MDA reduces input feature dimensionality by
projecting NF-dimensional input features into a (NC−1)-dimensional subspace, where it
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is assumed that NF≥NC. This linear transformation (projection) is performed with a goal
toward maximizing the out-of-class separation (class mean differences) and minimizing
within-class spread (variance within each class) of input data projections [13].
The out-of-class (inter-class, Sb) and within-class (intra-class, Sw) scatter matrices in
MDA are computed as [44],
Sb =
NC∑
i=1
PiΣi , (2.16)
Sw =
NC∑
i=1
Pi(µi − µ0)(µi − µ0)T , (2.17)
with class covariance (Σi) and global mean (µ0) calculated as follows,
Σi = E[(x − µi)(x − µi)T ] , (2.18)
µ0 =
NC∑
i=1
Piµi , (2.19)
where µi is the mean and Pi is the prior probability of each NC class. The within-class
scatter matrix in (2.17) provides a measure of probability-weighted class feature variance
and the out-of-class scatter matrix in (2.16) provides a measure of the average (over all
classes) distance between individual class means from the respective global mean.
The NF-dimensional input RF-DNA fingerprint vectors, F from (2.13), are projected
into the lower (NC−1)-dimensional subspace using,
f̂ = WT F , (2.20)
where W is the NF×(NC−1) transformation (projection) matrix formed from the NC−1
eigenvectors of S−1w Sb and f̂ is the projected RF-DNA fingerprint. This linear projection
by matrix W results in the optimal ratio between inter-class distances and intra-
class variances [44]. Figure 2.4 shows two possible representative MDA projection
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transformations (W1 and W2) for NC=3 classes onto a 2-dimensional subspace; for this
illustration W1 provides the “best” class separation.
Figure 2.4: Representative projections for NC=3 classes projected onto 2-dimensional
subspaces using W1 and W2 [13]; W1 is more optimal in this case.
2.4 Maximum Likelihood (ML) Classification
This section describes the ML classification process used in the research methodology
described in Chapter 3. When considering NC>2 classes comprised of NF-dimensional
input features, ML classification can be performed using an MDA-based model described
in Sect. 2.3; the “model” consists of projection matrix W. The available input data set for
each of the NC classes is divided into Training and Testing data sets, with the Training set
used for MDA model development per Sect. 2.3 and Testing set used for ML classification.
For ML classification, the MDA model (W) is first used to project the Training set for
all NC classes into the Fisher space. Class specific projected means (µ̂i) and covariances
(Σ̂i) are then computed for i=1, 2, . . . ,NC. The projected data is assumed to be multivariate
Gaussian distributed with class-dependent means of µ̂i and class-dependent covariances of
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Σ̂i. Alternately, identical covariances can be assumed and a pooled covariance estimate Σ̂P
used for all classes:
Σ̂P =
1
NC
NC∑
i=1
Σ̂i . (2.21)
The assumed MVG distributions effectively represent posterior conditional probabil-
ities that can be used to measure class likelihood for projected Testing fingerprint f̂. For a
pooled covariance estimate, likelihood estimation can be implemented as [33, 44],
P
(
f̂|NCi
)
=
1
(2π)(NC−1)/2 det
(
Σ̂P
)1/2 · exp(Fe) , (2.22)
where,
Fe = −
1
2
(
f̂ − µ̂i
)T (
Σ̂P
)−1 (
f̂ − µ̂i
)
. (2.23)
Class likelihood values are used for ML classification based on Bayesian decision theory
by assigning a class label to subsequent Testing data. In the case of NC classes, a given
projected Testing fingerprint f̂ is assigned to class ci according to,
P
(
ci|f̂
)
> P
(
c j|f̂
)
∀ j , i , (2.24)
where i=1, 2, . . . ,NC and P
(
ci|f̂
)
is the conditional posterior probability that f̂ belongs to
class ci. The conditional posterior probability P
(
ci|f̂
)
is found by applying Bayes’ Rule and
using class likelihood values as shown [33, 44]:
P
(
ci|f̂
)
=
P
(
f̂|ci
)
P(ci)
P
(
f̂
) (2.25)
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where prior probabilities are assumed equal for all classes (P(ci)=1/NC) and thus can be
neglected when making (2.24) comparison. Since (2.25) is applied for a given projected f̂
fingerprint, P
(
f̂
)
remains constant across all ci and can also be neglected as well. Using the
decision criteria from (2.24), projected “testing” fingerprints f̂ are assigned a class label
ci based on maximum posterior probability, with correct classification occurring when the
assigned class label matches the true class label. This ML classification process is used in
the research methodology to perform device classification as described 3.5.2.
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III. Research Methodology
This chapter provides the methodology used to conduct this research and obtainresults presented in Chap. 4. Topics are presented sequentially relative to the
RF-DNA processing overview shown in Fig. 3.1. This process begins with ZigBee
device signal collections made in three different environment scenarios as described
in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 explains the post-processing procedure that is performed
on collected emissions prior to RF-DNA fingerprint generation. Section 3.3 provides
specifics on how ZigBee time-domain features are used to generate RF-DNA fingerprints.
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) and two quantitative selection methods 1) pre-
classification Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)-Test p-value ranking and 2) post-classification
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) λi relevance
ranking are introduced in Section 3.4. As explained in Section 3.5, RF-DNA fingerprints
were input to a Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) process and the resultant model
used for both Maximum Likelihood (ML) Device Classification (Section 3.5.2) and device
ID verification, specifically Authorized Device ID Verification (Section 3.5.3.1) and Rogue
Device Rejection (Section 3.5.3.2).
3.1 Signal Collection
An Agilent E3238S [2] receiver (Rx) was used to collect emissions from ten Texas
Instruments (TI) CC2420 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee devices (denoted herein as
Dev1, Dev2, ..., Dev10). The Agilent Rx can collect signals at an Radio Frequency (RF)
center frequency spanning fc=20.0 MHz to fc=6.0 GHz using a tunable RF filter with
an instantaneous bandwidth of WRF=36.0 MHz. The selected frequency band is down-
converted to an Intermediate Frequency (IF) of fIF=70 MHz and digitized by an Nb=12 bit
Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) operating at a sampling rate of fs=95 Mega-Samples-
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Figure 3.1: Overview of AFIT’s RF-DNA Fingerprinting Process [36].
per-second (MSps), digitally down-converted to near baseband, baseband filtered with a
specific (user defined) bandwidth WBB, and automatically sub-sampled at a rate based on
(WBB) in accordance with Nyquist criteria requirements. All resultant collected samples are
stored as complex In-phase and Quadrature (I-Q) data in a .cap file format [3].
Prior to device signal collections all CC2420 radio transceivers were programmed to
transmit 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant packets (bursts, pulses, etc.) with an arbitrary
payload at a rate of 14 transmissions-per-second. The arbitrary payload is irrelevant
to this research because RF-DNA fingerprints are generated from the Synchronization
Header (SHR) region within the transmitted bursts. For each transmitting (Tx) CC2420
device, a total of NB=1000 burst responses were collected under three operating conditions,
including: 1) both the Tx and RX antenna inside a Ramsey STE3000B RF shielded
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anechoic chamber (“CAGE”) as done in [11, 31], 2) the Tx and Rx having a clear Line-of-
Sight (“LOS”) path down a hallway–location A in Fig. 3.2 [12]) , and 3) the Tx and Rx on
opposite sides of a wall (“WALL”)–location B shown in Fig. 3.2 [12].
During “Cage” collections the Tx position was consistently maintained at 20 cm
from a dipole antenna in an RF-absorbent Ramsey STE3000B test enclosure that was
connected to the Agilent Rx input by a shielded cable. For the experimental “LOS”
collections (location A), the devices under test (Tx) were placed 5.0 m from a stationary
6 dB gain Ramsey LPY2 log periodic antenna [32] attached to the Rx. For “WALL”
collections (location B), the devices (Tx) were placed behind an interior wall (5.5 m from
Rx) consisting of 1.6 cm-thick drywall separated by 9.2 cm steel studs spaced 40.6 cm
on center, for a total thickness of 12.4 cm, where fiberglass sound batting fills inter-stud
spaces. For both “LOS” and “WALL” collection locations the log periodic antenna was
aligned with the main beam pointing down an office environment hallway at the collection
device locations shown in Fig. 3.2. The collected Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) over the
Region Of Interest (ROI) was found to be S NRC≈50, 40, 30 dB for “CAGE”, “LOS”, and
“WALL” locations, respectively.
Figure 3.2: Operational indoor collection geometry showing collection receiver antenna
pattern and ZigBee device (A) “LOS” and (B) “WALL” experimental collection locations.
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3.2 Post-Collection Processing
The post-collection processing here was performed similarly to the methodology used
in [12, 31]. The Agilent receiver collection files (.cap format) were converted for use with
MATLAB® (.mat format) and post-collection processed by 1) detecting individual bursts
using an amplitude-based threshold detection process, 2) removing detected bursts from the
collection file, 3) down-converting individual bursts and applying baseband digital filtering,
and 4) power scaling noise to achieve the desired SNR and model the effects of differing
channel conditions. The Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) was digitally filtered the
same as collected bursts and power-scaled to achieve the desired S NR=[0-30] dB. Given
the high collection S NRC over the ROI, the like-filtered AWGN was added directly to the
collected IQ data and was the dominant noise source.
3.2.1 Burst Detection.
The CC2420 devices were programmed to transmit bursts at a rate of approximately 14
bursts-per-second (1 burst every 69 ms) and transmissions were collected from one device
at a time. The Aglient receiver stored the collected transmissions in a .cap file format
which was converted to a .mat file for use in MATLAB®. Detection and extraction of burst
responses were found using a amplitude-based threshold detection process with specific
parameters including: termination threshold (tT ), detection threshold (tD), minimum burst
length (PMIN), and maximum burst length (PMAX). The instantaneous amplitude response
(a[n]) of collected ZigBee bursts was calculated using (2.1) and converted to dB using,
a[n]dB = 20 log10
a[n]
1.0 v
. (3.1)
The result of (3.1) is illustrated in Fig. 3.3 for a collection containing NB=4 bursts
and a typical burst detection termination theshold (tT ). Burst detection begins by finding
the global peak amplitude response CG=max{|a[n]|} ∀ n in a given (.mat) collection file.
Detection threshold tD is then applied as shown in Fig. 3.4 to determine the leading and
trailing edges of a declared burst, these edges correspond to leading/trailing edge sample
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indices (nl, nt) within a[n] at which |a[n]|≈CG − tD occurs. The estimated burst duration
(nt − nl) is calculated and compared to PMIN and PMAX to determine if the declared burst
meets the estimated ZigBee pulse width, PMIN<(nt − nl)<PMAX. If the declared burst meets
all requirements, it becomes a detected burst and is extracted (removed from the collection
file); else, the declared burst is discarded. This iterative process continues by finding the
next maximum peak amplitude value CMAX=max{|a[n]|}, estimating burst duration, and
so on. The detection process is terminated when either 1) the desired number of bursts are
detected, or 2) the condition CMAX<CG−tT occurs for a declared burst indicating max{|a[n]|}
is below the pre-established termination threshold, tT . The specific values used for ZigBee
burst detection are provided in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Burst detection parameters for ZigBee transmission collections.
Parameter Variable Value
Termination Threshold tT 6.0 dB
Detection Threshold tD 9.0 dB
Pulse Min Duration PMIN 850 µsec
Pulse Max Duration PMAX 870 µsec
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Figure 3.3: Representative ZigBee collection showing NB=4 bursts and a typical processing
termination threshold (tT ).
57.6 57.7 57.8 57.9 58.0 58.1 58.2 58.3 58.4 58.5 58.6
−90
−85
−80
−75
−70
−65
Time (ms)
A
m
pl
itu
de
 M
ag
ni
tu
de
 (
dB
) tD
866 µsec
Figure 3.4: Representative detected ZigBee burst and typical detection threshold (tD).
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3.2.2 Digital Filtering.
The detected bursts are down-converted to baseband ( f =0) using a Power Spectral
Density (PSD) average estimated center frequency f̂c for the 16 possible channels spanning
2.4 Ghz to 2.4835 GHz [26]. The down-conversion frequency ( f̂DC) is estimated channel-
by-channel such that bursts within estimated channels are all down-converted by the same
estimated channel frequency. The down-converted signal is then digitally filtered using
a 8th-order Butterworth baseband filter having a −3 dB bandwidth of WBB=1.0 MHz.
Figure 3.5 shows the PSD of a ZigBee baseband emission overlaid with the impulse
response of the Butterworth baseband filter.
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Figure 3.5: Representative ZigBee burst PSD response overlaid with an 8th-order
Butterworth digital filter impulse response.
3.2.3 Signal-to-Noise Ratio Scaling.
The high collected S NRC over the ROI allows for the addition of power-scaled,
like-filtered AWGN to generate analysis signals with S NRA∈[0 30] dB. These analysis
signals allow for classification and verification performance assessment under varying
channel conditions. Using the analytic expression for an arbitrary complex sequence {x(i)},
i=1, 2, . . . ,K, the estimated average power in X is given by,
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X =
1
K
K∑
i=1
x(i)x∗(i) , (3.2)
where x∗(i) is the complex conjugate of x(i). The collected ZigBee signals are complex and
consist of two components,
sc(i) = st(i) + nb(i) , (3.3)
where st(i) and nb(i) are the collected transmitted signal and collected background noise,
respectively. The total power in sc can be calculated as,
S c = S t + Nb , (3.4)
where S c was measured over the ROI and Nb was measured when no signal was present
using (3.2) given by,
S c =
1
K
K∑
i=1
sc(i)s∗c(i) , (3.5)
Nb =
1
K
K∑
i=1
nb(i)n∗b(i) , (3.6)
Rearranging (3.4) the transmitted signal power S t is calculated and the estimated collected
S NR in dB over the ROI is given by,
S NRdBC = 10 × log10
(
S t
Nb
)
, (3.7)
which yielded S NRC≈50, 40, 30 dB over the ROI region for “CAGE”, “LOS”, and
“WALL” locations collections, respectively.
The desired scaled analysis signal sA(i) is generated by adding zero-mean, like-filtered,
independent AWGN samples according to,
sA(i) = st(i) + nb(i) + nG(i) , (3.8)
where the average power in {nG(i)} is scaled to achieve a desired range of S NRA.
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A complex, zero-mean, normally distributed random sequence with an estimated
average power of 1 (NG=1) produces the AWGN samples. This complex sequence was
digitally filtered by the same Butterworth filter used for the collected signal to produce
like-filtered AWGN samples. The sequence is then power-scaled by Rn to achieve the
desired S NRA, with Rn calculated using,
Rn =
√
10
−S NRA
10 × S t , (3.9)
which results in a total average AWGN power NG given by,
NG =
1
K
K∑
i=1
RnnAWGN(i)Rnn∗AWGN(i) . (3.10)
The corresponding analysis S NRA is then,
S NRdBA = 10 × log10
(
S t
Nb + NG
)
. (3.11)
For general collection conditions the scaled AWGN power is generally much greater than
the collected background noise power (NG>>Nb) and (3.11) reduces to,
S NRdBA ≈ 10 × log10
(
S t
NG
)
. (3.12)
3.3 RF Fingerprint Generation
This section provides details on statistical time-domain RF-DNA fingerprint genera-
tion as introduced in Section 2.2. For this research, the ZigBee SHR region was selected as
the ROI given that it 1) was experimentally observed within all bursts collected from all de-
vices and 2) is independent of MAC frame information and payload data. The SHR region
(40 bits total length) is comprised of a preamble sequence (32 bits in length) and the Start-
of-Frame Delimiter (SFD) (8 bits in length) and consisted of 1920 collected time samples.
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For this research the SHR time-domain signals were broken down into NR=80 subregions (2
subregions for each bit) where 24 time samples were contained in each subregion. NR=80
subregions was chosen because it showed improved device discrimination performance
when compared to NR=40 subregions (1 subregion for each bit). Full-dimensional RF-DNA
fingerprints were generated using (2.7) through (2.14) based on NC=3 signal characteristics
(a, φ, f ) and NM=3 statistic metrics (σ2, γ, κ), for a total of NFull=NM×(NR + 1)×NC=729
features per RF-DNA fingerprint. For this research the standard deviation statistic metric
was omitted due to its close relation to variance. Figure 3.6 shows a representative time
domain response for a ZigBee SHR region. The experimentally observed SHR duration of
TS HR≈160 µs is consistent with the IEEE 802.15.4 specification [26].
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Figure 3.6: Representative ZigBee SHR response used as the region of interest for RF-DNA
fingerprint generation.
3.4 Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA)
The Fisher-based MDA process in Section 2.3 inherently masks feature contribution to
resultant classification performance and it is impossible to determine which features have
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the greatest impact. The goal of Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) is to minimize
the number of RF fingerprint features (NF) while achieving a certain classification accuracy.
One approach to minimize the number of features (dimensions) is to use the features that
provide the most significant contribution to classification while removing less relevant
features. Insight into feature relevance is addressed here quantitatively using: 1) a pre-
classification KS-Test goodness-of-fit test [12, 31], and 2) a post-classification feature
relevance ranking provided by GRLVQI processing [33, 36].
The KS-Test goodness-of-fit selection process includes [12, 31]:
1.) Generating a full-dimensional (NF) feature set using (2.14) for NS HR responses
at a specific SNR from each of the ND devices to be classified.
2.) Conducting NPW=[(ND − 1)ND]/2 pairwise two-sample KS-tests using the NF
dimensional feature sets between every two devices under test, and forming a
matrix of resultant p-values with dimension NPW×NF .
3.) Summing each feature’s p-values across pairwise combinations and rank-
ordering the summed p-values from lowest-to-highest while tracking feature
index number.
4.) Determining a summed p-value cutoff threshold, or arbitrarily setting a most
relevant feature length l, to decide which features are retained for classification.
The quantitative pre-classification feature reduction process can be used to identify
and select a most relevant, length l, subset of the full-dimensional RF-DNA feature set F
prior to Multiple Discriminate Analysis, Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classification.
The KS-Test is a suitable option for analyzing statistical features differences and is
used here to quantify differences in Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) between
full-dimensional RF-DNA features from two devices. KS-Test results in Section 4.3
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are presented as summed p-values from all pairwise combinations of the ND devices
considered, where lower p-values indicate a more significant data set difference [31].
The second alternative to feature selection is based on GRLVQI processing which
inherently provides an indication of feature relevance following model development. The
process here was adopted entirely from previous demonstrations showing that GRLVQI
is a powerful tool for performing device classification and DRA [33, 38]. The GRLVQI
process provides a relevance indicator (λi value) for each feature comprising the RF-DNA
fingerprint at a specified SNR. The relevance value provides a measure of contribution
to class (device) separation within the GRLVQI classification process. The higher the
relevance value, the greater the impact on class separation. Feature DRA is achieved rank-
ordering λi values and selecting the top-ranked, arbitrary length l, features from the full-
dimensional feature set.
3.5 Device Discrimination Process
Statistical RF-DNA fingerprints for ZigBee device SHR responses are used as inputs
into a device discrimination process. Figure 3.7 shows a block diagram for the device
discrimination process used in this research. This process begins with separating collected
RF fingerprints into “Training” and “Testing” sets, where the “Training” fingerprints are
used for Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) model development. Once a model is
developed, “Testing” fingerprints are projected into the mapped feature space and used for
either 1) Device Classification (a 1 vs. ND “Looks most like?” assessment) or 2) Device ID
Verification (a 1 vs. 1 “Looks how much like?” assessment).
3.5.1 MDA Model Development.
As introduced in Section 2.3, MDA can be applied when discrimination of two or
more classes (devices) is required (ND>2). For results presented in Chapter 4, MDA model
development is performed using a pool of RF-DNA fingerprints from ND=4 ZigBee devices
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Figure 3.7: Block diagram of device discrimination process supporting both classification
and verification using selected measures of similarity and test statistics.
(Dev1, Dev2, Dev3, and Dev4) constructed as a “hybrid” data set of fingerprints from the
“CAGE”, “LOS”, and “WALL” collection scenarios; the result is referred to as a ”hybrid”
MDA model throughout the document. During model development MDA reduces input
feature dimensionality by projecting NF fingerprint features onto a (ND-1)-dimensional
subspace. The MDA projection matrix Wt is developed as shown in Fig. 3.8 using an
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iterative K-fold training process with a goal toward projecting higher-dimensional input
fingerprint F data into a lower dimensional subspace such that inter-class separation is
maximized and intra-class spread is minimized [13]. The parenthetical S NR denotes that
the Wt(S NR), µ̂i(S NR), and Σ̂P(S NR) generally varies with SNR, requiring MDA models
to be developed for each SNR.
Figure 3.8: Signal collection, post-collection and K-fold MDA model development
(training) processes. A representative 2D Fisher space is shown for ND=3 ZigBee devices
operating at S NR=10 dB. Clustering of the 100 projected training fingerprints (o) per
device shown relative to class means (•).
For all results presented in Chapter 4, MDA model development was accomplished by
using a K-fold cross-validation training process, shown in Fig. 3.9, where values of K=5
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and K=10 are commonly used and provide sufficient statistical certainty [25]; a value of
K=5 was used here. The K-fold training process consists of:
1. Randomly Parsing “Training” fingerprints into K blocks.
2. Separating K blocks such that K-1 blocks are used for training and one block is
retained for model validation.
3. Performing MDA transformation on K-1 blocks using projection matrix WK , as
described in Section 2.3.
4. Computing training class (device) means (µ̂i) and pooled covariances (Σ̂P) to be used
for Multivariate Gaussian (MVG) distributed models, as described in Section 2.4.
5. Tracking fold ML classification performance (%CK) using the retained validation
block, as described in Section 2.4.
6. Repeating steps 2-5 such that a different block is retained for validation until K
iterations are completed.
7. Determining the WK and corresponding µ̂i, and Σ̂P that achieved maximum (Best)
classification performance (highest %CK).
3.5.2 Device Classification.
Once MDA model development is accomplished, device classification is performed
using a Maximum Likelihood (ML) classifier as described in Section 2.4, with input
“Testing” fingerprints classified as being affiliated with one of ND=4 possible devices.
For ML classification, the prior probabilities are assumed to be equal, the costs uniform,
and the device likelihoods have a MVG distribution with means (µ̂i) and covariances (Σ̂P)
as computed during MDA model development. The ML classification process consists of:
1) inputting a “Testing” fingerprint F j for a collected emission from an unknown device
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of K-fold cross-validation training process used for MDA model
development. The “best” model WB is selected as the WK yielding maximum %CK .
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D j, 2) projecting F j into the Fisher space using f̂ j = WtF j, and 3) associating f̂ j as being
from the device with the maximum conditional likelihood probability according to,
Di : arg max
i
[
p(Di|f̂ j)
]
(3.13)
where i=1, 2, . . . ,ND and p(Di|f̂ j) is the conditional likelihood probability that fingerprint
f̂ j belongs to device Di. Correct classification is achieved when projected “Testing”
fingerprints are classified to be from their true device. Average percent correct (%C) device
classification is calculated as the percentage of the time the classifier correctly assigns the
fingerprint to its true device over all trials.
3.5.3 Device ID Verification.
For device ID verification (a 1 vs. 1, claimed vs. actual, “Looks how much like?”
assessment), the process used here is consistent with the methodology used in [11, 12, 33].
The focus here is on answering “Does the device’s current RF-DNA fingerprint match the
stored RF fingerprint template associated with its claimed bit-level identity?”. RF-DNA
fingerprints can be used to authenticate a device’s claimed bit-level identity, i.e., a device
wants to access a network and has presented its MAC address, SIM number, IMEI number,
etc., to gain access [11]. Bit-level credentials can be easily replicated by rogue devices,
and RF-DNA fingerprint verification provides a means to mitigate unauthorized access
attempts. This is done by a 1-to-1 comparison of current vs. claimed RF signatures, with
the claimed signature being a stored template associated with the claimed bit-level identity.
Each designated authorized device in a network will have a stored RF signature reference
template that is used when a current “Testing” RF fingerprint is received and has claimed
an ID of a authorized device. The device ID verification process is used here for two
performancwe assessments, including:
1. Authorized Device ID Verification: Granting network access to authorized
devices presenting true bit-level credentials.
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2. Rogue Device Rejection: Denying network access to unauthorized rogue
devices presenting false bit-level credentials.
3.5.3.1 Authorized Device ID Verification.
Authorized device ID verification is an assessment of how similar a device’s current
RF fingerprint matches the stored reference model associated with the claimed identity,
when only considering “Testing” RF fingerprints from a pool of ND authorized devices.
The similarity measure, or verification test statistic (zV) reflects “How well” the current and
claimed RF fingerprint identities match and is compared with a threshold (tV) to verify the
device’s claimed ID and grant or deny network access. Verification test statistics (zV) can
be generated from probability-based measures or geometric measures such as distance,
spatial angle, etc. The specific test statistics used here for Device ID Verification are
inherently provided in the “posterior” output variable of MATLAB® classify function.
The posterior matrix contains normalized conditional Multivariate Gaussian posterior
probabilities given by,
zV =
p(Di|f̂ j)
ND∑
k=1
p(Dk|f̂ j)
, (3.14)
where i = 1, 2, . . . ,ND and f̂ j is the current projected RF fingerprint claiming to have an ID
from device, Di. For this research it is assumed that each authorized device claims ND IDs
(one for each authorized device). For a given “Testing” RF fingerprint this produces ND
test statistics, where one test statistic is from the proper true device and ND−1 test statistics
are from device’s claiming a false ID.
Authorized device ID verification is evaluated one claimed ID at a time, where test
statistics are generated for all ND authorized device’s “Testing” data set producing two
Probability Mass Functions (PMFs): 1) an In-Class PMF, and 2) an Out-of-Class PMF.
Where the In-Class PMF is formed by test statistics (zV) from a device that is actually
who it claims to be, the current RF fingerprint is from the proper authorized device. Each
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authorized device will have a corresponding In-Class PMF and these are known as the
stored true reference templates associated with the authorized device’s ID. Out-of-Class
PMF is generated using (zV) for the case when a authorized device falsely claims an identity
of a different authorized device. Figure 3.10 shows a representative In-Class and Out-of-
Class PMF generated from arbitrary test statistics (zV) for a single claimed ID. The In-
Class probability is defined as p[zV |Ci,D j], where i= j and Ci is the claimed Device ID
(i=1, 2, . . . ,ND) and D j is the actual (current) device. The corresponding Out-of-Class
probability is denoted as p[zV |Ci,D j], where i, j and j=1, 2, . . . ,ND.
Figure 3.10: Representative In-Class (unfilled) and Out-of-Class (filled) Probability Mass
Functions (PMFs) for an arbitrary test statistic (zV). These are used to generate an
Authorized Device ID Verification ROC curve for a specific claimed ID and varying
threshold tv.
Authorized device ID verification is evaluated for all claimed IDs and is assessed using
conventional Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve analysis [15]. True and false
device ID verification rates are generated by varying the threshold (tV) shown in Fig. 3.10
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and measuring the area of each PMF. True Verification Rate (TVR) is a measure of “how
well” current RF fingerprints match its true claimed ID and is the area under the In-Class
PMF when zV<tV . The corresponding False Verification Rate (FVR) provides a measure
of “how well” current RF fingerprints match a false claimed ID and is the area under the
Out-of-Class PMF when zV<tV . As the threshold (tV) varies, corresponding TVR and FVR
are used to generate a ROC performance curve. As shown in Fig. 3.11, ROC performance
is a function of S NR. Representative thresholds (t1<t2<t3) are shown to emphasis that a
given verification threshold tV dictates TVR and FVR performance.
Figure 3.11: Representative Authorized Device ID Verification ROC curves showing
performance variation as a function of S NR, i.e., degradation for decreasing S NR.
3.5.3.2 Rogue Device Rejection.
Using the same process as authorized device ID verification, Rogue Device Rejection
capability can be measured when a rogue device presents false bit-level credentials in an
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attempt to gain unauthorized network access. Rogue device rejection is an assessment of
how similar unauthorized rogue device’s current RF fingerprint matches the stored true
reference template associated with the claimed identity presented by the rogue device.
“Testing” RF fingerprints are generated for previously unseen NR rogue devices using the
same method describe in this chapter and projected into the (ND-1) Fisher subspace. The
zV test statistics from (3.14) are generated to provide a measure of ”How well” the rogue
device’s current RF fingerprint matches claimed authorized devices RF fingerprint. For
this research it is assumed that each rogue device claims ND IDs (one for each authorized
device). For a given rogue “Testing” RF fingerprint this produces ND test statistics, where
the rogue device claimed a false ID.
Rogue device rejection is evaluated one claimed ID at a time, where test statistics are
generated for a single NR rogue device’s “Testing” data set producing a new Out-of-Class
PMF, that is compared to the stored true reference template (In-Class PMF) associated with
the rogue device’s claimed ID. For a single claimed ID, Fig. 3.12 shows a representative
unchanged In-Class PMF from Fig. 3.10 and the new Out-of-Class PMF generated from
arbitrary test statistics (zV). The In-Class probability is defined as p[zV |Ci,D j], where i= j
and Ci is the claimed Device ID (i=1, 2, . . . ,ND) and D j is the actual (current) device.
The corresponding Out-of-Class probability is denoted as p[zV |Ci,Dk], where k, j and
k,1, 2, . . . ,ND, and Dk is a rogue device.
Rogue device rejection is assessed using conventional ROC curve analysis [15].
Varying the threshold (tV) shown in Fig. 3.12 and measuring the area under the curve for
each PMF will determine the True Verification Rate (TVR) and Rogue Accept Rate (RAR).
TVR is a measure of “how well” current RF fingerprints match its true claimed ID and is
the area under the In-Class PMF when zV<tV . The area under the In-Class-PMF is the same
as shown in Fig. 3.10. The corresponding RAR provides a measure of “how well” current
rogue RF fingerprints match a falsely claimed authorized device ID and is the area under
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Figure 3.12: Representative In-Class (unfilled) PMF from Fig. 3.10 and Out-of-Class
(filled) PMF for arbitrary test statistic zV . These are used to generate an Rogue Device
Rejection ROC curve for a specific claimed ID and selected threshold tv.
the Out-of-Class PMF when zV<tV . The RAR is a measure of “how often” a rogue device is
granted network access when falsely claiming a bit-level identity of a authorized network
device. Rogue Reject Rate (RRR) is defined as RRR=1−RAR; a higher RAR (lower RRR)
reflects poorer security performance. Figure 3.13 shows representative authorized device
ID verification and rogue device rejection ROC performance curves, illustrating the process
of setting a threshold (tV) to achieve a desired TVR corresponds to a given authorized device
false verification rate and a rogue accept rate for a specific claimed ID.
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Figure 3.13: Representative Authorized Device ID Verification and corresponding Rogue
Device Rejection ROC curves. Verification threshold tV is set to achieve desired authorized
device TVR and FVR which maps directly to a corresponding rogue device RAR (RRR)
for a specific claimed ID.
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter provides results for ZigBee device discrimination, to include DeviceClassification and Device ID Verification using full-dimensional and reduced
dimensional RF-DNA feature sets. The reduced dimensional subsets are obtained through
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) as described in Sect. 3.4 using a qualitative
phase-only feature selection process as in [11, 31] and two quantitative selection
methods, including: 1) pre-classification Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)-Test p-value ranking
and 2) post-classification Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved
(GRLVQI) feature relevance ranking. Device Classification and Device ID Verification
are performed using the methodology discussed in Section 3.5. Section 4.1 provides the
details how Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) training was accomplished, including
the selection of Training and Testing data sets. Section 4.2 provides baseline Multiple
Discriminate Analysis, Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classification performance using
full-dimensional RF-DNA fingerprints. Section 4.3 provides comparative DRA feature
selection results for the three selection methods considered. Section 4.4 provides
Device Classification results using selected DRA feature sets, and Section 4.5 provides
verification results, including Authorized Device ID Verification and Rogue Device
Rejection performance using DRA reduced feature sets.
4.1 MDA Training and Model Development
MDA training was accomplished using NS HR=500 independent ZigBee Synchronization
Header (SHR) responses collected from each location (“CAGE”, “LOS”, and “WALL”) for
each device used for hybrid model development (Dev1, Dev2, Dev3, Dev4). In addition,
NNz=5 independent, like-filtered, Monte Carlo Noise realizations were added to the SHR
responses for each analysis SNR considered. Thus, for ND=4 devices MDA training, K-
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fold generation of the “best” MDA model (Wt, µ̂i, Σ̂P) and MVG statistics of projected
Training fingerprints, are on a total of NT NG=(500 SHR)×(3 Locations)×(5 NNz)=7500 in-
dependent Training realizations per device. Results for classification are likewise based on
NS HR=500 Testing fingerprints per location for each device and NNz=5 noise realizations
per SNR, resulting in NTS T =7500 Testing realizations. This large number of trials reduced
the CI=95% Confidence Interval (CI) bars to within the vertical extent of the plotted data
markers. Therefore, the CI=95% are intentionally omitted in all plots to enhance visual
clarity and qualitative assessment.
4.2 Device Classification: Full-Dimensional Performance
Full-Dimensional RF-DNA feature sets are based on NC=3 signal characteristics (a,
φ, and f ), NM=3 statistics (σ2, γ, and κ), and NR + 1=81 total regions. Thus, the composite
fingerprint F for each collected emission is comprised of NF=729 RF fingerprint features as
given by (2.14). Figure 4.1 shows the full-dimensional classification Testing performance
for the hybrid location (responses from “CAGE”, “LOS”, and “WALL”) scenario and
S NR∈[0 24] dB. An arbitrary performance benchmark of %C=90% (average across
devices) is achieved at S NR=9.2 dB(≈10.0 dB), with all devices achieving %C=80% or
better classification at this point. Each device classification performance curve shown in
Fig. 4.1 is an average performance across locations (“CAGE”, “LOS”, and “WALL”).
4.3 Device Classification: DRA Feature Selection
Results in Fig. 4.1 show that the arbitrary %C=90% benchmark can be achieved for all
devices at various S NR using a full-dimensional NF=729 feature set, with average cross-
device %C=90% achieved at S NR≈10.0 dB. Feature down-selection was next performed
using DRA to determine the minimum number of features required to maintain average
cross-device %C=90%. Feature relevance was determined using RF fingerprints extracted
from emissions at S NR=10.0 dB (the S NR at which %C=90% in Fig. 4.1). Quantitative
40
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
SNR (dB)
%
 C
or
re
ct
 C
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
(C
%
)
 
 
Device 1
Device 2
Device 3
Device 4
Average
Figure 4.1: MDA/ML Device Classification performance using a full-dimensional
(NF=729) ZigBee feature set at indicated S NR. The cross-device average is shown and
used for subsequent comparison with DRA performance results.
DRA was performed using the NF=729 full-dimensional feature with 1) pre-classification
KS-Test p-value ranking and 2) post-classification GRLVQI λi feature relevance ranking.
Quantitative DRA enables identification and selection of feature subsets, where the
most relevant features are selected from the full-dimensional feature set. Figure 4.2 shows
the NF=729 full-dimensional ZigBee feature number indices and corresponding relevance
indicators for S NR=10.0 dB using 1) pre-classification KS-Test p-values and 2) post-
classification GRLVQI λi relevance values. Most significant feature relevance is indicated
by a lower summed p-value from the KS-Test and a higher λi from the GRLVQI process.
The DRA process simply involves sorting Fig. 4.2 results to establish a rank-ordering that
can be used to select a desired number of most relevant features.
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4.4 Device Classification: DRA Performance
Previous research [11, 31] has qualitatively shown that ZigBee phase-derived features
possess greater discriminating information than either amplitude-derived or frequency-
derived features when used with an MDA/ML classifer. As detailed in Section 3.3, the
full-dimensional ZigBee feature set consists of NF=729 total features, including NF̂=243
amplitude, phase, and frequency features. Figure 4.3 displays DRA subsets comprised
of NF̂=243 selected features and their corresponding indices for 1) qualitative phase-only
feature selection, 2) quantitative KS-Test top-ranked feature selection, and 3) quantitative
GRLVQI top-ranked feature selection.
Figure 4.4 shows average Device Classification performance using the NF=729 full-
dimensional feature set and the DRA≈66% subsets (NF̂=243 features retained) shown in
Fig. 4.3. Relative to full-dimensional performance, the DRA≈66% subsets yield relatively
consistent classification performance and exhibit a “gain” of G≈−1.0 dB at the %C=90%
benchmark; the “gain” metric is introduced here for comparative assessment and defined
as the difference, expressed in dB, in required S NR (dB) for two systems, methods, etc., to
achieve a specified performance %C.
Further reduction of RF-DNA fingerprint dimensionality is obtained using the top-
ranked NF̂=200, 100, 50, and 25 features that were quantitatively selected using the 1) pre-
classification KS-Test and 2) post-classification GRLVQI relevance rankings. Figure 4.5
displays the top-ranked NF̂=243, 200, 100, 50, and 25 features from both quantitative DRA
methods and their corresponding index number within the full-dimensional feature set.
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Figure 4.2: Unsorted DRA feature relevance indicators: (a) KS-Test p-values and
(b) GRLVQI λi relevance values. Results shown here for S NR=10.0 dB which corresponds
to a cross-device %C≈90% in Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.3: DRA Selected NF̂=243 subsets of full-dimensional (NF=729) feature set.
Selection based on 1) qualitative phase-only, 2) quantitative top-ranked KS-Test, and
3) quantitative top-ranked GRLVQI feature selection methods.
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Figure 4.4: Average MDA/ML device classification performance using DRA selected
NF̂=243 feature subsets shown in Fig. 4.3. Full-dimensional NF=729 performance from
Fig. 4.1 provided for comparison.
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(a) Pre-Classification KS-Test.
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(b) Post-Classification GRLVQI.
Figure 4.5: Illustration of top-ranked NF̂=243, 200, 100, 50, and 25 DRA feature subsets
using (a) pre-classification KS-Test and (b) post-classification GRLVQI rankings.
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The effect of additional feature reduction and assessment of hybrid location classi-
fication performance is shown in Fig. 4.6 using DRA subsets containing the top-ranked
NF̂=243, 200, 100, 50 and 25 features that were quantitatively selected using 1) pre-
classification KS-Test and 2) post-classification GRLVQI relevance rankings. Considering
the previously established %C=90% benchmark for assessing DRA classification perfor-
mance, results in Fig. 4.6 show that:
1. The required S NR for KS-Test top-ranked NF̂=243 and NF̂=50 feature sets
approximately spans S NR∈[10 18] dB, with the top-ranked NF̂=25 feature set never
achieving the %C=90% benchmark. This is an indication that the MDA model
development process is unable to achieve adequate inter-class separation and/or
sufficient intra-class spread minimization using only NF̂=25 features.
2. The required S NR for GRLVQI top-ranked NF̂=243 and NF̂=50 feature sets
approximately spans S NR∈[10 18] dB which is consistent with KS-Test feature
selection performance. However, the GRLVQI top-ranked NF̂=25 feature set also
achieves the %C=90% benchmark at S NR≈30 dB.
The KS-Test and GRLVQI feature selection performances in Fig. 4.6 are summarized
in Table 4.1 which shows the “Gain” for each DRA case relative to performance using the
DRA≈66% reduced NF̂=243 feature set.
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(a) KS-Test Feature Selection.
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(b) GRLVQI Feature Selection.
Figure 4.6: MDA/ML Device Classification performance using DRA subsets from Fig. 4.5
selected by (a) KS-Test p-values and (b) GRLVQI λi relevance values. Average NF̂=243
DRA performance from Fig. 4.4 provided for comparison.
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Table 4.1: MDA/ML Device Classification performance “Gain” (dB) for DRA subsets in
Fig. 4.6 relative to performance using the DRA NF̂=243 feature subset.
DRA Method
Number of DRA Features (NF̂)
243 200 100 50 25
KS-Test 0.0 dB -0.2 dB -2.6 dB -6.1 dB N/A
GRLVQI 0.0 dB -0.3 dB -1.9 dB -6.75 dB -17.8 dB
4.5 Device ID Verification
Verification of a device’s claimed bit-level ID provides a means for granting authorized
devices network access while denying access to unauthorized devices. It is assumed here
that a device wanting to gain network access provides a claimed bit-level ID and that RF-
DNA features can be used to authenticate the claimed ID. The Device ID Verification
process performs a 1-to-1 comparison between a device’s current RF-DNA fingerprint
and a stored reference fingerprint for the claimed bit-level ID. Device ID verification is
accomplished here using the methodology described in Section 3.5.3 and emissions from
10 ZigBee devices, including: 1) the same ND=4 authorized devices used previously for
device classification assessment (Dev1, Dev2, Dev3, and Dev4), and 2) an additional
NR=6 unauthorized “rogue” devices (Dev5, Dev6, Dev7, Dev8, Dev9 and Dev10). The
verification process is used to assess both Authorized Device ID Verification performance
using the ND=4 authorized devices, and Rogue Device Rejection performance using the
NR=6 rogue devices. Of particular importance is that the hybrid MDA model developed in
Sect. 4.1 for Device Classification is also used here for verification assessment.
4.5.1 Authorized Device ID Verification.
Authorized device ID verification is performed using the same independent NTS T =7500
projected Testing fingerprints from classification for each of the ND=4 authorized devices.
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Verification performance is evaluated at S NR=18.0 dB using NF̂=50 DRA reduced fea-
ture sets selected by rank ordering 1) pre-classification KS-Test p-values and 2) post-
classification GRLVQI λi relevance values.
For ROC curve generation and analysis, each of the ND authorized devices presents
a true claimed ID for itself, as well as, a false claimed ID for the other authorized
devices (e.g., Dev1 presents a claimed ID for Dev1, Dev2, Dev3, and Dev4). For a
specific claimed bit-level ID, NTS T =7500 projected Testing fingerprints from each of the
ND authorized devices are used to generate (NTS T =7500)×(ND=4)=30000 normalized
Multivariate Gaussian posterior probability test statistics according to (3.14). The
collection of test statistics are used to create the In-Class and Out-of-Class Probability Mass
Functions (PMFs) described in Section 3.5.3 for the specific claimed ID. For example, the
In-Class PMF is constructed from 7500 test statistics where the current RF-DNA fingerprint
is indeed from the true claimed device ID; this same In-Class PMF is subsequently used
for Rogue Device Rejection assessment in Sect. 4.5.2. The associated Out-of-class PMF
is constructed from 22500 test statistics where the current RF-DNA fingerprint is from a
falsely claimed device ID. Representative PMFs are presented in Fig. 4.7 for one specific
case where all ND=4 authorized devices present claimed bit-level IDs for Dev2. The
resultant In-Class and Out-of-Class PMFs are used to produce one Authorized Device ID
Verification Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve.
Figure 4.8 shows Authorized Device ID Verification performance for each of the ND=4
authorized ZigBee devices for a DRA reduced feature set of NF̂=50 features selected using
1) pre-classification KS-Test values, and 2) post-classification GRLVQI relevance rankings.
The verification ROC curves were generated at S NR=18 dB which corresponds to the
%C=90% benchmark in Fig. 4.6 using the same feature set. The ND=4 ROC curves show
that there exists a device-dependent verification threshold tV(m) such that all authorized
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(a) In-Class PMF: Device 2, 7,500 Testing RF-DNA fingerprints.
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(b) Out-of-Class PMF: Devices (1,3,4), 22,500 Testing RF-DNA fingerprints.
Figure 4.7: In-Class and Out-of-Class PMFs for Claimed ID = Device 2. Generated from
test statistic zV in (3.14) for KS-Test top-ranked NF̂=50 features at S NR=18 dB.
device IDs can be verified at True Verification Rate (TVR>90%) and False Verification
Rate (FVR<10%) for both methods considered.
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(a) KS-Test Feature Selection.
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(b) GRLVQI Feature Selection.
Figure 4.8: ZigBee Authorized Device ID Verification for ND=4 authorized devices
operating at S NR=18.0 dB (%C≈90% in Fig. 4.6) using top-ranked NF̂=50 features from
(a) pre-classification KS-Test and (b) post-classification GRLVQI selection methods.
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4.5.2 Rogue Device Rejection.
The ability to use RF-DNA to reject unauthorized rogue devices presenting false bit-
level identities is demonstrated using the same ID verification process used for authorized
devices. Rogue Device Rejection is an assessment of “how well” current RF-DNA
fingerprints from a pool of rogue (previously unseen and unauthorized) devices match
RF-DNA fingerprints associated with the claimed ID of an authorized device. This is
demonstrated here using NR=6 (Dev5, Dev6, Dev7, Dev8, Dev9, Dev10) unauthorized
rogue devices whose emissions were collected under various conditions (“CAGE”, “LOS”,
and “WALL”). A total of NTS T =(1000 S HR)×(1 Location)×(5 NNz)=5000 previously
unseen RF-DNA fingerprint realizations were used for each of the NR devices. Table 4.2
lists the 9 ZigBee device ID and collection condition combinations that were considered
using the NR=6 rogue devices. For each of the 9 different combinations, the rogue device
presented a claimed ID for each of the ND=4 authorized device, producing a total of 36
Rogue Device Rejection scenarios.
Table 4.2: Nine ZigBee Device ID and collection condition combinations used for Assess-
ing Rogue Device Rejection capability. Grey cells correspond untested combinations.
ZigBee ID CAGE LOS WALL
Dev5 X X
Dev6 X X
Dev7 X X
Dev8 X
Dev9 X
Dev10 X
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For a specific claimed bit-level ID, NTS T =5000 projected Testing fingerprints from a
rogue device are used to generate 5000 test statistics using (3.14). The collection of test
statistics are used to construct the Out-of-Class PMF which is used with the corresponding
claimed ID In-Class PMF generated as part of the Authorized Device ID Verification
process in Sect. 4.5.1. The resultant PMFs are used to produce one ROC performance
curve. As detailed in the following two subsections, Rogue Device Rejection capability
was assessed using each of the DRA feature selection methods.
4.5.2.1 KS-Test Selected Features.
Results for Rogue Device Rejection assessment using the KS-Test DRA selected
features are presented in Fig. 4.9. These results include the 36 rogue scenarios using top-
ranked NF̂=25, 50, 100 feature sets at S NR=18.0 dB. These are conventional ROC curves
presented as True Verification Rate (TVR) versus Rogue Accept Rate (RAR), where Rogue
Reject Rate is defined as RRR=1−RAR; a higher RAR (lower RRR) reflects greater rogue
access and poorer network security performance. Authorized Device ID Verification ROC
curves are provided alongside the rogue device ID ROC curves to enable identification of
the fixed threshold that achieves authorized device TVR>90% and direct mapping to the
corresponding RAR (RRR) for each rogue scenario. The solid black curves in Fig. 4.9 (b),
(d), and (f) correspond to rogue scenarios that achieve an arbitrary RAR<10% (RRR>90%)
performance benchmark when the threshold is fixed such that TVR>90%. As indicated,
performance using NF̂=25, 50, 100 KS-Test feature sets achieved the arbitrary RRR>90%
benchmark in 21, 29, and 30 out of the 36 rogue scenarios, respectively. Table 4.3
through Table 4.5 highlight rogue scenarios which fail to achieve the arbitrary RRR>90%
performance benchmark using selected DRA feature subsets.
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(a) Authorized ID Verification: NF̂=25.
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(b) Rogue Device Rejection: NF̂ = 25.
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(c) Authorized ID Verification: NF̂=50.
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(d) Rogue Device Rejection: NF̂=50.
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(e) Authorized ID Verification: NF̂=100.
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(f) Rogue Device Rejection: NF̂=100.
Figure 4.9: Performance using KS-Test selected features (NF̂=25, 50, 100) for ND=4
authorized devices and NR=6 unauthorized rogue devices in various operating scenarios
falsely claiming each of the ND=4 authorized device IDs (36 total rogue scenarios). Grey
ROC curves correspond to rogue scenarios where RAR<10% (RRR>90%) is not achieved.
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Table 4.3: ZigBee device ID and collection condition combinations from Table 4.2 where
Rogue Device Rejection performance in Fig. 4.9 fails to meet RAR<10% (RRR>90%) with
NF̂=25 features selected using KS-Test DRA at S NR=18 dB. The numbers correspond to
the Rogue device claimed ID and indicate failure for 15 of 36 rogue scenarios.
ZigBee ID CAGE LOS WALL
Dev5 3 1,3
Dev6 1,3 1,3
Dev7 1,3 1,3
Dev8 1
Dev9 1
Dev10 3,4
Table 4.4: ZigBee device ID and collection condition combinations from Table 4.2 where
Rogue Device Rejection performance in Fig. 4.9 fails to meet RAR<10% (RRR>90%) with
NF̂=50 features selected using KS-Test DRA at S NR=18 dB. The numbers correspond to
the Rogue device claimed ID and indicate failure for 7 of 36 rogue scenarios.
ZigBee ID CAGE LOS WALL
Dev5 3 1
Dev6 3
Dev7 1
Dev8 1
Dev9 1
Dev10 4
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Table 4.5: ZigBee device ID and collection condition combinations from Table 4.2 where
Rogue Device Rejection performance in Fig. 4.9 fails to meet RAR<10% (RRR>90%) with
NF̂=100 features selected using KS-Test DRA at S NR=18 dB. The numbers correspond to
the Rogue device claimed ID and indicate failure for 6 of 36 rogue scenarios.
ZigBee ID CAGE LOS WALL
Dev5 3 1
Dev6 3
Dev7 1
Dev8
Dev9 1
Dev10 4
56
4.5.2.2 GRLVQI Selected Features.
Results for Rogue Device Rejection assessment using the GRLVQI DRA selected
features are presented in Fig. 4.10. These results include the 36 rogue scenarios using top-
ranked NF̂=25, 50, 100 feature sets at S NR=18.0 dB. As with KS-Test results presented in
Sect. 4.5.2.1, an arbitrary RRR>90% benchmark is used for comparative assessment at an
Authorized Device ID Verification operating point of TVR>90%. The solid black curves in
Fig. 4.10 (b), (d), and (f) correspond to rogue scenarios that achieve the arbitrary RRR>90%
benchmark for a fixed threshold yielding TVR>90%. As indicated, performance using
NF̂=25, 50, 100 GRLVQI feature sets achieved the arbitrary RRR>90% benchmark in 23,
28, and 30 out of the 36 rogue scenarios, respectively. Table 4.6 through Table 4.8 highlight
rogue scenarios which fail to achieve the arbitrary RRR>90% performance benchmark
using selected DRA feature subsets.
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(a) Authorized ID Verification: NF̂=25.
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(b) Rogue Device Rejection: NF̂=25.
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(c) Authorized ID Verification: NF̂=50.
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(d) Rogue Device Rejection: NF̂=50.
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(e) Authorized ID Verification: NF̂=100.
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(f) Rogue Device Rejection: NF̂=100.
Figure 4.10: Performance using GRLVQI selected features (NF̂=25, 50, 100) for ND=4
authorized devices and NR=6 unauthorized rogue devices in various operating scenarios
falsely claiming each of the ND=4 authorized device IDs (36 total rogue scenarios). Grey
ROC curves correspond to rogue scenarios where RAR<10% (RRR>90%) is not achieved.
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Table 4.6: ZigBee device ID and collection condition combinations from Table 4.2 where
Rogue Device Rejection performance in Fig. 4.9 fails to meet RAR<10% (RRR>90%) using
NF̂=25 features selected using GRLVQI DRA at S NR=18 dB. The numbers correspond to
the Rogue device claimed ID and indicate failure for 13 of 36 rogue scenarios.
ZigBee ID CAGE LOS WALL
Dev5 3 1
Dev6 3 3,4
Dev7 1,3 1,3
Dev8 1
Dev9 1
Dev10 3,4
Table 4.7: ZigBee device ID and collection condition combinations from Table 4.2 where
Rogue Device Rejection performance in Fig. 4.9 fails to meet RAR<10% (RRR>90%) with
NF̂=50 features selected using GRLVQI DRA at S NR=18 dB. The numbers correspond to
the Rogue device claimed ID and indicate failure for 8 of 36 rogue scenarios.
ZigBee ID CAGE LOS WALL
Dev5 3 1
Dev6 3 3
Dev7 1
Dev8
Dev9 1
Dev10 3,4
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Table 4.8: ZigBee device ID and collection condition combinations from Table 4.2 where
Rogue Device Rejection performance in Fig. 4.9 fails to meet RAR<10% (RRR>90%) with
NF̂=100 features selected using GRLVQI DRA at S NR=18 dB. The numbers correspond
to the Rogue device claimed ID and indicate failure for 6 of 36 rogue scenarios.
ZigBee ID CAGE LOS WALL
Dev5 3 1
Dev6 3
Dev7 1
Dev8
Dev9 1
Dev10 4
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V. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter provides a summary of research activities, research contributions, andrecommendations for further research.
5.1 Summary
This research was conducted to expand AFIT’s RF “Distinct Native Attribute” DNA
(RF-DNA) fingerprinting process to support IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee communication system
applications. ZigBee-based wireless networks are energy efficiency, low complexity,
low cost, and widely deployed in many applications, including energy management and
efficiency, home, building, and industrial control automation, and home area networks to
name a few [14, 45, 46]. As ZigBee networks continue to increase in popularity, higher
levels of security become essential and are critical to protect sensitive personal information
and physical system access. The particular security concern addressed under this research
is the exploitation of bit-level device identities (ID) to gain unauthorized network access.
To counter bit-level “spoofing” attacks, RF-DNA fingerprints are extracted from
Physical (PHY) waveform features and used to achieve human-like discrimination of
ZigBee network devices in a typical operational environment. By designating certain
devices as authorized and others as unauthorized, ZigBee network vulnerability to
outsider threats is assessed using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves to
characterize both Authorized Device ID Verification performance (granting network access
to authorized users presenting true bit-level credentials) and Rogue Device Rejection
performance (denying network access to unauthorized rogue devices presenting false bit-
level credentials).
For demonstrations here, emissions were collected from TI CC2420 ZigBee devices
operating under three environmental scenarios: 1) “CAGE”–devices and collection receiver
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antenna both in an anechoic chamber, 2) “LOS”–devices within Line-of-Sight of the
collection receiver antenna, and 3) “WALL”–devices placed behind a wall relative to the
collection receiver antenna. For each device, RF-DNA fingerprint features were extracted
from a “hybrid” pool of emissions containing emissions from each of the operational
environments. The hybrid features were used for Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA)
model development and Maximum Likelihood (ML) Device Classification performed using
both full-dimensional and Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) reduced dimensional
RF-DNA fingerprints. The DRA reduced sets were selected using a 1) pre-classification
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)-test process and 2) post-classification Generalized Relevance
Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) feature relevance ranking process. The
same hybrid MDA/ML model was used in a verification process for assessing Authorized
Device ID Verification and Rogue Device Rejection. In both cases, devices attempt to gain
network access by providing bit-level ID credentials (ZigBee MAC address); authorized
devices present true bit-level IDs while rogue devices present false bit-level IDs matching
authorized device IDs. The 1 vs. 1 verification process extracts RF-DNA fingerprints
from a current device emission and compares it with stored RF-DNA fingerprint for the
claimed ID. Network access is granted (rightly or wrongly) based on a measure of similarity
(test statistic) that provides a “Looks how much like?” assessment of the two RF-DNA
fingerprints.
5.2 Conclusions
Using device RF-DNA features remains a viable alternative for augmenting bit-level
security protocols. This is supported by results here which show that RF-DNA from IEEE
802.15.4 Zigbee emissions can be used as inputs to an MDA/ML discrimination process
to perform reliable 1 vs. ND “Looks most like?” classification assessment, as well as
1 vs. 1 “Looks how much like?” verification assessment. Performance was first assessed
with an MDA/ML model developed using features from a “hybrid” pool of emissions from
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ND=4 devices and full-dimensional RF-DNA fingerprints comprised of NF=729 features.
Device Classification performance achieved an arbitrary benchmark of average correct
classification %C>90% (across all devices) for S NR≥10.0 dB, with individual devices
achieving %C>80% at this same S NR.
The full-dimensional NF=729 feature set was reduced using DRA and resultant clas-
sification and verification performance assessed. The top-ranked NF̂=243 ZigBee feature
subset was qualitatively selected according to related work in [31], and quantitatively se-
lected using two methods, including: 1) pre-classification KS-Test p-value ranking [12, 31],
and 2) post-classification GRLVQI λi relevance ranking [12, 33, 36]. Hybrid MDA/ML De-
vice Classification performance using these DRA≈66% reduced subsets was marginally
poorer than full dimensional performance and reflected a “gain” of G≈−1.0 dB at the
%C=90% benchmark; gain is defined herein as the reduction in required S NR, expressed
in dB, for two systems, methods, etc., to achieve a given %C performance. Thus, the im-
plementation trade-off is a 66% reduction in the number of features (computational com-
plexity, storage, etc., reduction) at the expense of requiring an additional S NR≈1.0 dB
improvement in channel conditions.
Additional quantitative KS-Test and GRLVQI DRA feature selection was performed
and classification performance assessed using the top-ranked NF̂=200, 100, 50, and 25
features. Relative to the %C>90% benchmark [12]:
1. The KS-Test selected feature sets required S NR≈10.0 dB (NF̂=243) to S NR≈18.0 dB
(NF̂=50), with results for NF̂=25 failing to meet the benchmark.
2. The GRLVQI selected feature sets required the same S NR≈10.0 dB (NF̂=243)
to S NR≈18.0 dB (NF̂=50), with results for NF̂=25 achieving the benchmark at
S NR≈30.0 dB.
Hybrid MDA/ML verification performance was assessed for 1) ND=4 authorized
network devices and 2) NR=6 unauthorized (rogue) network devices. Performance was
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evaluated using the NF̂=50 DRA feature set at S NR=18.0 dB given that the %C=90%
benchmark was achieved under these conditions. ROC curve analysis for Authorized
Device ID Verification indicated that there exists a device dependent threshold tV(m) for all
authorized devices such that a True Verification Rate of TVR>90% and False Verification
Rate of FVR<10% are realized for both DRA methods; this range of TVR and FVR was
arbitrarily selected for comparative assessment.
Rogue Device Rejection capability was assessed using NR=6 unauthorized devices
placed in nine collection combinations of various experimental “CAGE”, “LOS”, and
“WALL” locations, with each rogue device falsely presenting a claimed ID matching
each of the ND=4 authorized IDs; a total of 36 rogue assessment scenarios. Considering
an arbitrary Rogue Rejection Rate of RRR>90%, ROC curve analysis for Rogue Device
Rejection indicated that performance using KS-Test and GRLVQI selected feature sets was
consistent. Specific performance included [12]:
1. The KS-test selected feature sets achieving RRR>90% in 21, 29, and 30 of the 36
rogue scenarios using NF̂=100, 50, and 25 top-ranked features, respectively.
2. The GRLVQI selected feature sets achieving RRR>90% in 23, 28, and 30 of the 36
rogue scenarios using NF̂=100, 50, and 25 top-ranked features, respectively.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
This research provides a proof-of-concept demonstration that highlights the promise
for augmenting ZigBee bit-level security mechanisms. This was done using RF-DNA
features with an MDA/ML discrimination process. The work here is by no means complete
and there are several potential directions that future research could take:
1. Performing a detailed assessment of ZigBee GRLVQI DRA–Results here for
dimensionally reduced feature sets were based on two separate rank-ordering and
selection methods (pre-classification KS-Test and post-classification GRLVQI) being
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developed in parallel under AFIT’s RF Intelligence (RFINT) program. GRLVQI
parameter settings and model development were not optimized for ZigBee emissions
as part of this research. Further analysis and GRLVQI optimization could be done to
better exploit feature set dependence, or independence, as collection location varies
(“CAGE”, “LOS”, “WALL”) and environmental conditions change.
2. Increasing the number of model training devices–An iterative process should be
considered for progressively expanding the pool of authorized devices being used
for model development. The less than perfect Rogue Device Rejection performance
here (RRR,100%) was not too surprising given that 1) MDA model development
is a classification-based versus verification-based optimization process and similar
results have been observed using other signals, and 2) only ND=4 authorized devices
were used for hybrid MDA/ML model development; it is highly unlikely that RF-
DNA features from ND=4 population members of a larger population (thousands or
even millions) accurately capture population behavior and provide broad human-like
discrimination. Increasing the sample size (training devices) will allow the developed
models to better represent the larger device population.
3. Considering alternate test statistics–Results here are based exclusively on inherent
MATLAB functionality for implementing MDA model development and performing
ML classification assessment (classify function), as well as, ROC curve (roc function)
verification performance assessment; the inherent normalized MVG posterior
probability similarity measure was used exclusively as the test statistic. There
are a myriad of additional probability-based, as well as distance-based, similarity
measures that could be considered and which may improve overall performance.
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